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Fig. 1. Visualization of RF-PUF at a system level 
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Abstract—Physical unclonable functions (PUF) in silicon 
exploit die-to-die manufacturing variations during fabrication 
for uniquely identifying each die. Since it is practically a hard 
problem to recreate exact silicon features across dies, a PUF-
based authentication system is robust, secure and cost-effective, 
as long as bias removal and error correction are taken into 
account. In this work, we utilize the effects of inherent process 
variation on analog and radio-frequency (RF) properties of 
multiple wireless transmitters (Tx) in a sensor network, and 
detect the features at the receiver (Rx) using a deep neural 
network based framework. The proposed 
mechanism/framework, called RF-PUF, harnesses already-
existing RF communication hardware and does not require any 
additional PUF-generation circuitry in the Tx for practical 
implementation. Simulation results indicate that the RF-PUF 
framework can distinguish up to 10000 transmitters (with 
standard foundry defined variations for a 65 nm process, leading 
to non-idealities such as LO offset and I-Q imbalance) under 
varying channel conditions, with a probability of false detection < 
10-3. 
Keywords—RF, IoT, Security, Authentication, PUF, Machine 
Learning, Wireless, Sensor nodes. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The recent advancements in cheap computing, communication, 
wearable and implantable technologies have enabled a myriad of 
devices to be connected through the Internet-of-Things (IoT). 
Many of these devices continuously operate under mobile and 
untrusted environments, containing potentially malicious 
attackers. Hence, identifying and authenticating each transmitting 
device in such a network is an imposing problem for the receiving 
device. One of the traditional authentication protocols, called 
symmetric-key cryptography, involves placing a secret key in a 
non-volatile memory (NVM) or a battery-powered SRAM which 
can subsequently be used to create a digital signature or hash 
based encryption. However, this technique is vulnerable to key-
hacking and suffers from significant area and power overhead. 
Because of these reasons, Physical Unclonable Functions (PUF), 
that exploit manufacturing process variations to generate a unique 
and device-specific identity for a physical system [1]-[5], are 
becoming increasingly popular. PUFs are simpler, smaller and 
more energy-efficient than NVM/SRAM-based solutions, and do 
not require anti-tamper mechanisms to detect invasive attacks. 
Based on the number of challenge-response pairs (CRP) that 
the PUFs can handle, they are usually classified into strong and 
weak PUFs. Weak PUFs support a small number of CRPs which is 
linearly proportional to the hardware complexity of the PUF. 
Strong PUFs, conversely, support a large number of CRPs and 
hence can avoid polynomial time attacks. As a result, strong PUFs 
are usually employed in device authentication applications. 
A PUF-based authentication protocol can enable easy and 
secure identification of devices in an IoT environment. When any 
narrowband Tx device modulates digital data, the resulting wave 
inherently contains device-specific unique analog/RF properties 
such as frequency offset and I-Q imbalance. These non-idealities 
are usually discarded/minimized at the receiver end as they are 
irrelevant in terms of the transmitted information. However, if 
those non-idealities are effectively harnessed using an in-situ 
machine learning framework at the Rx, the entropy information 
can be extracted for each of these transmitters, which leads to 
secure identification. Fig. 1presents the RF-PUF framework in 
presence of channel impairments, wherein every transmitter work 
as an instance of the PUF. Since RF-PUF requires no extra 
hardware at the Tx, it is even more interesting for an asymmetric 
network (such as the body area network) where the Tx needs to be 
low power and the Rx is a hub that can operate at a higher 
bandwidth and power. Such a framework can find multiple 
applications such as surveillance, forensic data collection and 
intrusion detection [6]-[7]. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section II 
lists the recent works in the domain of RF authentication. Section 
III describes the proposed RF-PUF, while Section IV presents the 
performance parameters. Section V summarizes our contributions 
and lists future directions and improvements. 
II. RELATED WORK 
RF fingerprinting [8]-[11]enables automatic identification of 
wireless nodes in a network by extracting specific temporal and 
frequency-domain properties during power-on. Two fundamental 
techniques are usually adopted for RF fingerprinting – a transient 
method and a steady-state method. The transient method offers 
consistent and acceptable classification accuracy only when the 
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Fig. 2. Simulation setup involving Tx and Rx for RF-PUF implementation 
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start and the end of the transient can be reliably identified [7]. 
Moreover, a high oversampling clock (0.5-5 Gs/s, as shown in [9]-
[10]) is required to properly analyse the transient properties. An 
alternative approach utilizes the steady-state properties of the Tx, 
extracted when the circuit transients are stabilized. However, the 
steady-state method requires fixed random channel access 
(RACH) preambles along with techniques such as spectral 
averaging or matched filtering [6]-[7], as the extracted properties 
depend on the transmitted bit-stream. The steady-state analysis 
method does not require sophisticated and high-power 
communication modules, as the steady-state properties can easily 
be identified. In this paper, we combine the concept of PUF with 
RF fingerprinting and develop a system architecture that utilizes 
the embedded RF properties of the Tx to authenticate wireless 
nodes using a machine learning framework in the Rx. To the best 
of our knowledge, this is the first work with a preamble-less 
steady state approach which trains the learning engine with 
multiple data streams and different channel conditions. RF-PUF 
utilizes the inherent non-idealities in the TX, and hence no 
additional hardware is required to generate the PUF identity, 
which is an important feature of the proposed system. 
III. RF-PUF: DEFINITION AND PROPERTIES 
Although the PUF properties of the system originate from the 
manufacturing process variations of the transmitters, the 
identification of each node is done in the Rx sub-system which 
extracts the following features from the received signal: 
A. Frequency features 
Every transmitter in a non-FDM wireless network should 
ideally operate at a fixed carrier frequency. However, due to the 
inherent variations in the oscillator, each Tx will have its unique 
frequency offset. This offset/error works as a prime feature for 
device identification as shown in [7] and [12]. Different standards 
allow different limits for the frequency offset. For example, the 
frequency error must be within 25 ppm of the center frequency 
(2.412 GHz) for the IEEE 802.11b standard. For a normal 
distribution, this corresponds to astandard deviation ( ) of 20.1 
kHz. An accurate and known reference clock in the Rx can 
calculate frequency offsets for multiple transmitters. Alternatively, 
a carrier synchronizer module (which already exists in a standard 
Rx for LO offset compensation) can be employed in the receiver 
that finds the frequency offset and compensates for it, as shown in 
our implementation in Fig. 2. The machine-learning sub-system 
identifies the Tx devices using this ppm offset as a prime feature. 
B. I-Q features 
The in-phase (I) and quadrature (Q) components of the Tx 
signal contains unique amplitude and phase mismatches for each 
Tx, which arises from the digital to analog conversion, power-
amplifier (PA) back-off and gain. Because of compressive 
nonlinearity, the outer symbols in the constellation are affected 
more than the inner symbols. Hence it is necessary to extract 
amplitude and phase information for all symbols separately. 
C. Channel features 
The communication channel can also introduce time and 
frequency dependent variations in the form of attenuation, 
distortion and Doppler shift. To estimate and compensate these 
non-idealities, an automatic gain control (AGC) block, a Root-
Raised Cosine (RRC) filter and a Doppler corrector is employed in 
the Rx as indicated in Fig. 2. The RRC filter, helps reducing inter-
symbol interference (ISI), while the AGC module provides a 
measure of the channel attenuation to an Artificial Neural Network 
(ANN). Similarly, the Doppler corrector module estimates and 
corrects the amount of Doppler shift due to mobility of Tx and Rx 
in the network, and provides the information to the ANN for 
compensation. 
D. 16-QAM system features 
In modern transceivers, 16-QAM is employed to achieve a 
higher spectral efficiency. However, in our implementation, it also 
helps in extracting enough I-Q features (amplitude and phase 
imbalance) to identify the devices using the ANN. 
E. Properties of the RF-PUF 
The proposed system exhibits the properties of a strong PUF 
[3] that makes it suitable for authentication applications: 
(a) Constructability: A PUF class P is constructiblewhen a 
random PUF instance (    ∈ P ) can be created by invoking a 
specific procedure, P. Create. 
   ← P. Create 
In case of RF-PUF, each transmitter is a PUF-instance. The 
technical limitations in the physical process of manufacturing the 
RF transmitters serve as the creation procedure  .        for the 
PUF instances.  
(b) Evaluability: A constructible PUF class P  is said to be 
evaluable when for a random PUF instance (   ∈ P) and a random 
challenge ( ), it is possible to evaluate a response  .  
  ← P. Eval[  ( )] 
  is the input bit-stream/challenge to each Tx (RF-PUF 
instance), and y is the unique response for Tx. 
(c) Reliability: An evaluable PUF class P  is 
reproducible/reliable if the intra-PUF-instance variation is 
probabilistically lower than a system-defined small number. 
For any PUF, reproducibility is often represented as the worst-
case difference ( D      ) between two distinct evaluations 
( ( ),  ′( )) on the challenge   for a particular PUF instance. 
D     ( )      [  ( ),   ′( )] 
D      is the intra-PUF Hamming distance that serves as a 
metric to measure the resilience of the RF-PUF to varying 
environmental conditions (temperature, supply etc.). In an ideal 
scenario, D      = 0% . 
(d) Uniqueness: An evaluable PUF class P  is unique if the 
inter-PUF-instance variation is probabilistically higher than a 
system-defined large number. 
 
Fig. 3. Preamble-less Training Framework for the ANN. This method enables 
on-the-fly authentication without knowing the expected bit-stream from the Tx. 
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The quantitative results for uniqueness and reliability are 
evaluated in Section IV. 
(e) Identifiability: A PUF class P is easily identifiable if it is 
reliable and unique, and if the intra-PUF variation is 
probabilistically lower than inter-PUF variation. 
Prob(D     ( ) < D     ( )) ≈ 1 
The simulation results shown in Section IV indicate that the 
worst case D     is 3.9 ppm while the correspondingD      is 2.9 
ppm over 1000 Transmitters. This means that the instances are 
identifiable for 1000 or more devices. 
(f) PUF Strength:  RF-PUF can support a large number of 
challenge-response pairs (CRP), since we are using multiple 
analog/RF properties to define a single instance of RF-PUF. For 
  distinct features in the real number space, the total number of 
CRPs for the RF-PUF will be  2   , when the real-number space is 
represented by 16-bit numbers. Evidently, the number of CRPs is 
exponential in the number of features, and tends to a large number 
for even small values of   (3-8). In other words, a probabilistic 
polynomial time (PPT) adversary can correctly predict the 
response to a new random RF-PUF instance/challenge with a 
negligible probability (1/2    ).This confirms that RF-PUF is a 
“strong PUF” which is suitable for identification applications as 
shown in [1]. 
F. Training the Neural Network 
To account for data variability in evaluation stage and to enable 
preamble-less operation, the neural network is trained in multiple 
iterations, and with different pseudo-random bit-streams (PRBS). 
The hyper-parameters, including the number of iterations required 
to compensate the effects of data variability were optimized 
aggressively. A feature matrix as shown in Fig. 3 was presented to 
the neural network as a training dataset. The extracted channel 
conditions for different training iterations were also presented as 
features which helps the network to learn to compensate for the 
channel variations. The number of hidden layers were also varied 
and was optimized for performance (detection accuracy). During 
Evaluation phase, a different pseudo-random data-stream from any 
of the transmitters is provided to the ANN for a different channel 
condition. Hence the neural network learns both data variabilities 
and channel variabilities simultaneously (at the cost of more 
training time) which lead to a robust system. 
IV. PERFORMANCE METRICS 
The proposed PUF is simulated using the MATLAB Neural 
Network toolbox, and the End-to-End QAM simulation toolbox 
with RF impairments and corrections. To model the statistical 
manufacturing variabilities, foundry-provided process information 
of a standard 65 nm technology is included in the simulations. A 
total of 10,000 PUF instances were simulated in presence of 
varying channel conditions. 
A. Probability of False Detection  
Fig. 4(a) shows the accuracy/probability of false detection of a 
Tx device as a function of the total number of transmitters in the 
network, which indicates that the error is < 10-3for 4800 
transmitters, and < 10-2for 10,000 transmitters. By increasing the 
number of neurons in the hidden layer from 10 to 50, the accuracy 
is improved. However, increasing the number of neurons to 100 
causes overfitting, and does not improve the performance of the 
system even though the complexity and power cost of detection 
increases. 
B. Robustness to Channel 
The communication channel is always affected by free-space-
path-loss, attenuation/noise in the medium (represented by  /  ), 
interference, Doppler shift and fading. The contribution of (  /
   )has the most dominant effect as shown in[13]. We have 
analyzed and shown the effect of this channel noise on the 
probability of false detection in Fig. 4(b). Inter-symbol 
interference (ISI) leads to an increased error probability of ≈ 0.02 
in absence of the RRC filter when the mean   /   of the channel 
is 15 dB, with a standard deviation of 10 dB. When the RRC filter 
is employed, ISI is reduced which makes the extraction of the I-Q 
features easier. This results in a reduced probability of error of 10-5 
for the same amount if of   /  variations as shown in Fig. 4(b). 
In our implementation, the ANN is trained using variable data-
streams in multiple iterations, which also includes variable amount 
of channel noise. As the number of training iterations increase, the 
performance of the system tends towards the performance 
achieved in fixed-preamble case. This overhead of having 
additional training iterations is simultaneously useful in terms of 
learning the channel variability, as each iteration will have a 
different channel condition which the network learns to 
compensate. 
C. Reliability (Intra-PUF Hamming Distance) and Uniqueness 
(Inter-PUF Hamming Distance) 
Fig. 4(c) presents the Reliability and Uniqueness of RF-PUF 
w.r.t. the input features provided to the ANN. Unlike a traditional 
digital PUF with multi-bit output, RF-PUF inherently embeds the 
unique signature of the Tx in the analog properties of the 
transmitted message, and hence the Intra-PUF and Inter-PUF 
Fig. 4. (a) Probability of False detection as a function of the total number of transmitters in the system. (b) Probability of False detection as a function of the 
standard deviation ( ) of the (
  
  
) in the channel in presence of AWGN. (c) Worst case Intra and Inter-PUF distance with 1000 Transmitters and 50 hidden layers  
w.r.t. geometric mean of normalized ppm variation of features. 
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distances can be plotted using the normalized parts-per-million 
(ppm) variation of the input features. However, a transformation 
of the feature spaces is required to represent the ppm variations of 
multiple features on a single axis. It should be noted that the total 
number of possible unique PUF instances is proportional to 
∏ 2       (  = number of features, 2
  = possible values for feature 
   when represented with 16 bits), and hence we can intuitively 
utilize the geometric mean of the ppm values of all the features for 
a PUF instance. This geometric mean of the ppm values of the 
features (for 1000 transmitters) is used as the X-axis in Fig. 4(c). 
The worst case inter-PUF variation for 1000 transmitters is 
found to be 3.9 ppm, while the corresponding intra-PUF variation 
is 2.9 ppm. Hence, it is possible to uniquely identify the 1000 
transmitters, but the probability of false detection keeps on 
increasing as the number of transmitters reaches a few thousands, 
as the difference between inter-PUF distance and intra-PUF 
distance reduces. 
D. Vulnerability to External Machine Learning Attacks 
The RF-PUF employs supervised learning to uniquely identify 
the PUF instances. However, for an external attacker, the problem 
of correctly identifying a device in the network and masquerading 
itself as the same Tx device remains an unsupervised learning 
problem with a different learning framework. As it is not possible 
to list all the CRPs in polynomial time, a PPT adversary takes a 
very long time for the unsupervised learning. 
Other PUF properties such as randomness (of the features), 
bias and stability with respect to temperature and supply is not a 
scope of this paper, and will be analyzed as a future work with 
hardware implementation where such notions can be properly 
justified. 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
A conceptual development of RF-PUF is presented in this paper, 
supported by simulation results utilizing standard foundry-defined 
variations for a 65 nm technology. The inherent manufacturing non-
idealities of a wireless Tx node can be exploited as a strong PUF for 
device identification in presence of channel imperfections and 
attenuation. An in-situ machine learning framework is shown to 
detect up to 10,000 devices with 99% accuracy. RF-PUF enables 
low-cost secure identification using intrinsic Tx properties embedded 
in the RF signal, without any extra hardware cost, and without any 
requirement for preamble-based or key-based authentication. The 
ANN in the Rx can be implemented on an application processor (on-
board, already present in modern IoT nodes). As a future extension of 
this study, methods of compensating Rx non-idealities will be 
analyzed, along with efficient practical implementations using 
software defined radios. The randomness and stability of RF-PUF in 
presence of temperature and supply voltage variation will also be 
analyzed as part of the future work. 
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